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[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 
J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska, Vice Chairman 



JON KYL, Arizona JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma MAX BAUCUS, Montana 



HANK BROVra, Colorado 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi, Ex Officio 
THOMAS A DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio 

Charles Battaglia, Staff Director 

Christopher C. Straub, Minority Staff Director 

Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk 



Hearing held in Washington, DC: Page 

Thursday, September 19, 1996 1 

Statement of: 

Bryan, Hon. Richard H., a U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada 15 

Cohen, Hon. WiUiam S., a U.S. Senator from the State of Maine 8 

Deutch, John, Director of Central Intelligence 3 

DeWine, Hon. Mike, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio 20 

Inhofe, Hon. James M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma 19 

Johnston, Hon. J. Bennett, a U.S. Senator from the State of Louisiana 14 

Kerrey, Hon. J. Robert, a U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska 20 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., a U.S. Senator from the State of Indiana 10 

Robb, Hon. Charles S., a U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth of Vir- 
ginia 17 

Shelby, Hon. Richard C, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama 12 

Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth of Penn- 
sylvania 1 




U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on Intelligence, 

Washington, DC. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:13 a.m., in 
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Arlen 
Specter, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Specter, Lugar, Shelby, DeWine, Inhofe, 
Cohen, Brown, Kerrey of Nebraska, Bryan, Johnston and Robb. 

Also Present: Charles Battaglia, Staff Director; Chris Straub, Mi- 
nority Staff Director; Suzanne Spaulding, Chief Counsel; and Kath- 
leen McGhee, Chief Clerk. 

Chairman Specter. The Intelligence Committee will proceed at 
this time. Vice Chairman Kerrey is occupied on other matters but 
expects to join us shortly and has asked that we proceed before he 
would arrive. 

Today, we will hear in open session from the distinguished Direc- 
tor of Central Intelligence, John Deutch, with the focus on Iraq to 
the extent that Director Deutch can inform us on intelligence pol- 
icy, to give us intelligence activities and intelligence findings, to 
give us an idea as to where we are heading in the Gulf. Two days 
ago. President Clinton convened a meeting with top Executive offi- 
cials, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, Director of 
Central Intelligence, Members from both the House and the Sen- 
ate, from both political parties. And that obviously, today, is the 
front burner issue. 

At the meeting with the President a discussion was held on mat- 
ters which are of great concern to the American people. That in- 
volves what may be expected from Saddam Hussein, what are the 
threats to Kuwait to the extent they can be discussed publicly. 
What are the threats, if any, to Saudi Arabia? What is the situa- 
tion with respect to the alliance where Kuwait initially did not give 
an affirmative answer to the deployment of U.S. troops there, and 
then came back accepting 3,500 instead of the figure of 5,000? And 
although Saudi Arabia permits our flights to cover the no-fly zone, 
we are flying planes from Guam half way around the world for mis- 
sile deplo3nTient. 

Also, questions in the north, to the extent that they can be dis- 
cussed publicly, with respect to the Kurds. 

These issues, we believe, ought to have an airing so that there 
can be a public understanding and a more widespread Congres- 
sional understanding because the items we are talking about in- 
volve considerable costs which have to be dealt with on the appro- 

priations process. And that is in mid-stream with the Congress 
having enacted initially on the appropriations bills and some ques- 
tion as to whether the President will accept the Congressional fig- 

We had expected to hear in open session today General Downing 
on the task force report as to the terrorist attack in Dhahran on 
June 25. And then late yesterday, we were informed by the Depart- 
ment of Defense that General Downing would not be available for 
an open session. A little hard to understand when matters were 
discussed yesterday in both the House and Senate on intelligence 
issues. There had been a critical question raised by the Secretary 
of Defense at his July 9 testimony before the Senate Armed Serv- 
ices Committee saying that the terrorist attack was caused by an 
intelligence failure, General Downing having testified yesterday 
that there was not an intelligence failure, General Gowning having 
testified further that the Department of Defense must invest more 
in human intelligence and counterintelligence. And those are criti- 
cal issues which are a matter for review by the Intelligence Over- 
sight Committees. 

We have noted the media reports about the scathing Downing 
task force report and the editorials attributing laxity to the Sec- 
retary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We 
have noted Senator Thurmond's comment about no evidence of re- 
sponse after the November 17 car bombing in Riyadh, and the call 
by some in the House for a Congressional inquiry on culpability 
with a question being raised about the adequacy of a three star 
general to deal with discipline when high ranking officials may or 
may not be involved. General Downing commented specifically 
about the brigadier general, that he had been dealt a bad hand and 
really could not cope with all the problems of security when his 
mission was a flight mission. And the report does criticize the top 
echelon of the Department of Defense for not providing the appro- 
priate guidance. 

In the context of yesterday's notification by the Defense Depart- 
ment about General Downing's unavailability for a public session, 
we will proceed at the moment in a private session to determine 
just how independent General Downing is and what his charter 
permits him to do on his own or with the direction orders from the 
Department of Defense. 

Now, let me yield at this time to Senator Lugar for an opening 

Senator LuGAR. I have no opening statement, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Specter. Senator Shelby. 

Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I have no opening statement. 

Chairman Specter. Senator Johnston. 

Senator JOHNSTON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to welcome the 
Director here, and that's it. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you very much. Director Deutch — 

Chairman COHEN. I have no opening statement [General laugh- 

Chairman SPECTER. I was afraid Senator Cohen might have an 
opening statement, which — Senator Cohen. 

Senator COHEN. During the course of my questioning, I might 
make an opening statement, but 

Chairman Specter. Senator Cohen had some pithy comments 
yesterday during the Armed Services hearing. Senator Bryan, 
would you care to make an opening statement? 

Senator Bryan. I'll waive my opening statement. Always a pleas- 
ure to have the Director here with us today. 

Chairman Specter. Well, thank you for joining us, Director 
Deutch. And you had asked if it would be appropriate for you at 
the outset to make a comment about allegations which have been 
in the media about CIA sale of drugs in the early '80s in connection 
with Nicaragua, Central America. You may proceed on that or as 
you see fit. 


Director Deutch. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

It's a pleasure to appear here before the Committee, and I thank 
you for the opportunity to address publicly the allegations that CIA 
engaged in drug trafficking in the early 1980s, in conjunction with 
support to the Contras and their effort to overthrow the Sandinista 
government in Nicaragua. 

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that I regard these allegations with 
the utmost seriousness. They go to the heart and the integrity of 
the CIA enterprise, and it's something that has to be addressed 
and addressed in a forthright and complete fashion. I know it's 
something that you want us to do, Members of this Committee 
want us to do. And I want to say to you and pledge to you that 
there will be an absolutely independent and thorough inquiry into 
these allegations. 

Our initial review has found no evidence to support the allega- 
tions. Nevertheless I think it is essential that we pursue them in 
all detail, and I intend to do so. I have asked the Inspector Gen- 
eral, the independent Inspector General, to undertake an inquiry 
and report back in 60 days, reviewing all documents, all sources, 
all information on this matter. 

I can assure you and pledge to you, Mr. Chairman — I believe you 
deserve it, you expect it as a Member of the Oversight Committee, 
the public expects it — that we will answer this question and resolve 
what is true and what is fiction about these allegations, and I 
wanted to let this Committee know that I intend to pursue it with 
all the energy that I have. 

Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to make some remarks 
about Iraq and put for you, just as you asked, in context what I 
believe from our intelligence sources and analysis what the situa- 
tion is in Iraq and how we got there. 

Let me go back and make a few remarks about internal develop- 
ments in Iraq since 1990, give you a sense of how that country has 
changed. Today the per capita income in Iraq is about $950 per 
year. In 1989 it was $2,300 per year. Oil production in 1989 was 
3.1 million barrels of oil per day. Today oil production is down to 
less than 600,000 barrels per day. 

Give you a sense of what the social fabric is like in that country. 
Kurdish, Shi'a and Sunni rivalries continues. The regime continues 
to be dominated by the Tikriti family of Saddam Hussein, and 
Sunni areas are better supported, more prosperous and better fed. 

Even though there is no embargo on food or medicine, public health 
has seriously declined since the Gulf War. As a result, infant mor- 
tality has risen to 140 deaths out of 1,000 births, compared to 29 
deaths out of 1,000 births in 1991. Ten percent of the entire popu- 
lation of Iraq is dependent upon humanitarian assistance. Corrup- 
tion remains rampant in the government. Saddam Hussein's family 
profits from covert sales of Iraqi oil and dominance of the black 
market, where money donated for medicines and food often end up. 
Baghdad has begun construction on 48 new palaces and today Sad- 
dam Hussein and the VIP leadership have the choice of up to 78 
different palaces and estates throughout Iraq. 

Of course, there is no press freedom and brutal suppression con- 
tinues. Baghdad continues to immediately stop any nascent politi- 
cal opposition. Saddam Hussein's security apparatus has systemati- 
cally destroyed all groups that have formed inside the country. Peo- 
ple are arrested and killed. He continues to drain the marshes of 
southeastern Iraq to deny haven for the Shi'a Iraqi families who 
live there and change the entire circumstances of living. 

In sum, the situation inside Iraq has become more brutal, less 
able for the Iraqi people to survive. 

In the meantime, there have been several changes in external 
factors bearing on Iraq and Saddam Hussein's position. Let me say 
that in general I believe that Saddam Hussein's position has been 
strengthened in the region recently. Why? 

First, six years of containment and sanctions have failed to dis- 
lodge Saddam Hussein from leadership. 

Second, Saddam Hussein still has the possibility of threatening 
his neighbors — Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. These countries 
want to see Saddam Hussein overthrown, but they have other in- 
terests as well. They want to assure that there will be stability in 
the region, they want to assure that Iraq's territorial integrity is 
maintained and they want to assure that there are better condi- 
tions for the Iraqi people. 

Third, there is also perception of weakened determination of the 
coalition to meet Iraqi aggression. Initial sentiment in the region 
led to no support for United States air strikes for the first time, 
drowning out criticism of Iraqi aggression. France temporarily 
stopped enforcing the extended no-fly zone. Russia criticized United 
States strikes and led a fight to kill a UK, a United Kingdom-spon- 
sored draft resolution condemning Iraqis' military operations 
against the Kurds. 

Fourth, Turkey's apparent willingness to deal more directly with 
Saddam is driven by a number of new factors. The new Reffa[?] 
Party is interested in addressing domestic energy concerns and 
strengthening trade relationships with Iraq. The Turkish general 
staff remains focused on the problem of eradicating the PKK-led in- 
surgency which is based in Iraq, Iran and Syria. 

Finally, Saddam Hussein has cleverly parlayed concerns about 
relief to UN Resolution 986, which will permit Saddam to export 
oil for humanitarian goods in hopes to gain a collapse of the sanc- 
tions' regime. All of these factors contribute to, today, a strength- 
ened position for Saddam Hussein in the region. 

Now, Saddam has several times in the past confronted the coali- 
tion on several occasions since the end of the Gulf War, approxi- 

mately 10. Six confrontations involved challenges to the United 
States' inspection of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. 

On one occasion, our response led to a cruise missile attack on 
nuclear weapons facilities near Baghdad in 1993. 

In October of 1994, Iraq moved two Republican Guard divisions 
to the Kuwaiti border in an effort to threaten Kuwait and pressure 
the UN into relieving sanctions. Heavy reinforcements by the Unit- 
ed States caused Saddam Hussein to back down. 

In June of 1993, the United States struck the headquarters of 
the Iraqi intelligence service in retaliation for an Iraqi assassina- 
tion attempt on the life of former President Bush in April of that 

The most recent set of confrontations is the third time that Iraq 
has challenged the no-fly zone in the north and in the south. In Au- 
gust of 1993, a coalition aircraft struck a surface-to-air missile site 
in northern Iraq that fired on one of our aircraft. In December of 
1992, an Iraqi air force airplane was shot down as it penetrated the 
southern no-fly zone. The Iraqis followed by moving surface-to-air 
missile systems into the zone in January of 1993. 

How did the current crisis emerge? Iraq's aggression against the 
Kurds was a catalyst of the most recent crisis. On October 31, the 
Kurds — the Iraqis with the cooperation — in conjunction with the 
KDP, the Kurdish Democratic Party, invaded the north and took 
the Kurdish-held city of Erbil. Let me give you a sense of the ex- 
tent of this military enterprise. Between 30 and 40 thousand Iraqi 
troops were engaged. Over 350 tanks were deployed. Three-hun- 
dred artillery pieces were deployed in the region for the sweep of 
the Iraqi motorized and armored divisions into the north. 

In the wake of the attack, the Kurdish Democratic Party, led by 
Massoud Barzani is now in control of most of the Kurdish-held 
northern Iraq, with only isolated pockets of the opposition Kurdish 
Party, the PUK. Barzani asked for Iraqi military assistance after 
the KDP experienced defeats in northern Iraq at the hands of the 
Patriotic Union for Kurdistan, the PUK. Barzani saw Iranian spon- 
sorship of the PUK as upsetting the delicate balance between the 
Kurdish factions. And you will recall that in July of this year, the 
Iranians did intervene in Northern Iraq on behalf of the PUK and 

Let me say that Barzani is playing an enormously dangerous 
game. First of all, in 1991, Saddam showed no reluctance to mas- 
sacre Kurds and members of Barzani's family. While no Iraqi mili- 
tary units remain in Kurdish-held territory at the time, it is clear 
that there are Iraqi intelligence and security personnel in the re- 
gion. Several hundred Kurds and Turkomans have been executed 
by the Iraqis, according to Iraqi opposition sources, but we cannot 
verify precise numbers. And finally, we estimate that there are 
roughly 40,000 Kurdish refugees, either in Iran or on the Iranian 

After tactical alliance against the PUK, and after taking of Erbil, 
Mr. Barzani is now approaching the coalition for protection in an 
effort to hold Saddam Hussein at arm's length while Saddam Hus- 
sein is putting increasing pressure on Barzani to negotiate a frame- 
work for autonomy under Baghdad's overall control. Iran has 
shown no intention of interfering yet. Teheran may be preoccupied 

by the refugee situation, certainly backs PUK guerrillas — along the 
border region — and continues to show an interest of maintaining its 
influence in the region. 

As a result of the United States response, which was to, first of 
all, strike at SAM air defense units in the South, and to extend the 
no-fly zone from 32 north, to 33 north, Iraq challenged our activi- 
ties in the no-fly zone. Iraq responded by reconstituting damaged 
sites, and deploying additional mobile SAM systems from central 
Iraq. Iraqi air defense units fired missiles, and air defense artillery 
fired at our coalition aircraft in both the southern and the northern 
zone. Today, for the last few days, Iraqi defense units are standing 
down in the wake of the U.S. military buildup. Iraq ceased to fire — 
make any fire against coalition aircraft since 13 September. The 
mobile SAM systems deployed in the no-fly zone are returning to 
their garrisons in central Iraq. 

What are the overall implications of this story that I've outlined 
to you? First, we should anticipate that Saddam will continue to 
challenge the coalition. In contrast to the past, he has been clever 
at taking advantage of an opportunity in northern Iraq created by 
differences among the Kurds and changed Turkish attitudes. 

Second, there will be no stability in the region or improved cir- 
cumstances for the Iraqi people until Saddam Hussein and his re- 
gime is replaced. 

Third, for all of these reasons, Iraq will continue to be, and has 
been, at the top of our intelligence priorities for both our collection 
and analytic effort. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd be pleased to address 
any questions that I can. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you. We will proceed in five-minute 

Thank you very much, Director Deutch, for that opening state- 
ment. There are a great many issues of concerns which you have 
broached: Saddam's intent; what his strength is; what has hap- 
pened by way of damage from our missile attacks; what our sup- 
port is among the allies on a variety of courses, the Iranian pres- 

But let me begin on an assessment of U.S. vital national interest 
with the intelligence evaluation of Saddam Hussein's capability to 
produce weapons of mass destruction. And then I want to move 
from that to whatever terrorist threat Iraq poses to the United 
States, internationally or domestically. 

Beginning with the issue of weapons of mass destruction, there 
has been a great deal of comment about chemical, biological compo- 
nents of his weapons of mass destruction. But begin. Director 
Deutsch, if you would, with an evaluation of where he stands on 
nuclear capability. 

Director Deutch. Well, in the case of nuclear capability, what we 
believe is that Iraq maintains both the motivation and the exper- 
tise to revitalize a nuclear program, should it be able to do so. 
Right now they are prevented from doing so because of the pres- 
ence of the UNSCOM regime and other efforts to monitor the sanc- 
tions on it. 

Chairman Specter. Are the monitoring procedures effective in 
curtailing Saddam's development of nuclear weapons? 

Director Deutch. At the present time, my judgment on that 
would be yes. I would like to remind you that we do not believe 
that he has available to him required amounts of fissile material 
to produce a nuclear device. That was what he was trying to do in 
1990, when the — the before the Gulf War. Our present estimate is 
that he has not got the capability to acquire nuclear capability — 
a nuclear device. 

Chairman Specter. And what are Saddam Hussein's ballistic ca- 

Director Deutch. Well, we believe he still has a dozen or so 
SCUD missiles and associated launchers which he would be able to 
launch SCUD missiles against his neighbors. 

Chairman SPECTER. There have been reports in the past about 
Saddam Hussein's developing the big cannon; back in 1990 reports 
about developing ballistic capability with various degrees of thrust 
force. Any intelligence on that? 

Director DEUTCH. I don't have particular details on where he is 
on his artillery engagements. I can get something for the record on 
that, sir. 

The missile capability that we believe that he has includes some 
SCUDS, and I think the more modern systems that he was work- 
ing on are now in abeyance. 

Chairman SPECTER. And would you comment on his capabilities 
as to chemical and biological warfare? 

Director DEUTCH. We believe that he retains an undetermined 
quantity of chemical and biological agents that he would certainly 
have the ability to deliver against adversaries by aircraft, by artil- 
lery or by SCUD missile systems. 

Chairman Specter. And what is the assessment, if any, as to his 
intent on that subject? 

Director Deutch. I don't think that we see any evidence of his 
intent to use weapons of mass destruction, and he, of course, did 
not do so during the Gulf War. 

Chairman Specter. Director Deutch, turn now to the issue of 
what kind of a terrorist threat, if any, is posed by Iraq and Saddam 

Director Deutch. Well, he is a significant terrorist threat. We 
know that in April of 1993 he mounted an effort to try to assas- 
sinate a former President of the United States, George Bush, in 
Kuwait. He continues to carry out terrorist activities in Jordan, 
Kuwait and elsewhere. He has sponsored many, many terrorist at- 
tacks on UN and relief personnel in northern Iraq. So he is an ac- 
tive provider of — also an active provider of safe haven for terrorist 
groups. Here is a person who does use terrorism as an instrument 
of statecraft, and he does so mostly in the region and with the 
neighbors who are his adversaries that surround him. 

Chairman Specter. Before my red light goes on, let me ask you 
one final question. And that is, what would be the balance of 
power, based on your intelligence evaluation, if Saddam Hussein 
were to be toppled, with respect to the balance posed by Iraq 
against Iran? 

Director Deutch. I don't think anybody is in a position to know 
what the character would be of a regime that succeeded Saddam 
Hussein. Let me just say that it is my own judgment that almost 


any regime would certainly lead to an improved circumstance for 
the Iraqi people and for security in the region. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Director Deutch. 

The Committee will proceed in accordance with our practice on 
order of arrival, and we turn now to Senator Cohen. 

Senator CoHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Director, as an analyst, would you say that you deter Sad- 
dam Hussein's aggression by blowing up a few radars and SAM 
sites in the south of Iraq, or southern Iraq, or by attacking his Re- 
publican Guards and armored capability in the north? 

Director Deutch. I think there are a number of instruments that 
deter Saddam Hussein, not only attacking his SAM sites, but also 
very importantly expanding the no-fly zone which effectively re- 
duces his sovereignty, prevents his troops from operating or from 
training, especially his air elements. All of these things — moving 
troops to Kuwait — all will contribute to deterring Saddam Hussein. 

Senator Cohen. So you think that the action that was taken in 
the south is going to have a greater impact in terms of curbing his 
potential aggression in the future than by taking out his military 
capability on the ground? 

Director Deutch. I think the action in the south has contributed 
him to pulling back, caused him to pull back for the moment. As 
I said clearly in my statement, I expect that he will continue to 
carry out aggression. 

Senator COHEN. What is the likelihood of Saddam Hussein mov- 
ing aggressively toward Kuwait? 

Director Deutch. At present we would estimate that to be very 
low indeed. 

Senator Cohen. Okay. To what extent are we jeopardizing Ku- 
waiti security by putting a more visible presence of U.S. personnel 
in Kuwait? If the threat is low at this point, what is the threat that 
would be engendered by putting more American troops in that re- 

Director Deutch. I mean, my estimate would be that the placing 
of 3500 additional troops to reach a total of one brigade strength 
there of 5000 deters any action by Saddam Hussein, it does not en- 
tice it. 

Senator Cohen. And does not create any problems in terms of 
potential terrorist attacks within Kuwait, as we saw within Saudi 
Arabia, by virtue of a larger American presence? 

Director Deutch. The measures of force protection being appro- 
priate, I think the answer to that, I would say yes, I agree with 
you, they do not create that risk. 

Senator Cohen. I didn't make the statement, I was asking a 
question. You don't have to agree with me. 

Director Deutch. In my judgment, deploying those troops does 
deter Saddam Hussein. 

Senator Cohen. And does not pose a threat to Kuwait security 
from internal 

Director Deutch. Does not pose a threat to Kuwaiti security. 

Senator COHEN. From an internal source. 

Director Deutch. Correct. 

Senator Cohen. All right. 

Could the bombing, in your judgment, that took place in Saudi 
Arabia have occurred without state sponsorship? 

Director Deutch. You're now speaking about Al Khobar Towers? 

Senator Cohen. Yes. 

Director Deutch. I do not want to discuss that in open session, 

Senator COHEN. All right. We'll discuss it in closed then. 

Yesterday, we heard again a request for more and more 
HUMINT, more human intelligence is necessary. 

Director Deutch. Yes, sir. 

Senator Cohen. When Senator Boren and I were Chair and Co- 
Chair, Vice Chair of the Committee, we provided a great deal of ad- 
ditional money for HUMINT intelligence capability. But it seems to 
me that is not necessarily the answer to defending ourselves or 
protecting ourselves against terrorism. More and more money 
doesn't necessarily translate like more aircraft or more tanks or 
more personnel, military personnel, into more capability. 

It seems to me at some point we have to look to defeat terrorism 
by going to its source. I gather you would agree with that, because 
in number two of your statement and your conclusions, you said 
there will be no stability in the region until Saddam Hussein is re- 
placed. That does not take more HUMINT. It requires the United 
States and its allies to take more action, does it not? 

Director DEUTCH. It requires political circumstances there which 
will lead to change, yes it does. 

Let me say to you that I still think that you need superb and ex- 
cellent human intelligence, but I agree with your statement that it 
requires concerted efforts by the coalition. 

Senator COHEN. It takes more than simply 

Director Deutch. Yes, sir. 

Senator Cohen [continuing]. Knowing where the troubles are. It 
takes some action on our part. 

Director Deutch. Absolutely. 

Senator Cohen. Yesterday again, we heard that there were cer- 
tain strands of intelligence that were going into, leading into Saudi 
Arabia prior to the bombing of the tower. And yet the strands in 
and of themselves were not collated and were not fused together 
in a way that sufficiently alerted our forces to the nature of the 
threat that was coming. Do you — we have a center for counterintel- 
ligence at the agency. There seems to be some complaint that per- 
haps the intelligence coming to the forces on the ground is not suf- 
ficient for them to construct a positive reaction. What is your as- 
sessment of that? 

Director Deutch. While I appreciate 

Senator Cohen. Was there an intelligence failure, as such? 

Director Deutch. I appreciate the opportunity to just address 

First of all, while I've read the Downing report carefully, and I 
find that the conclusions that he's made and the findings that he's 
made on intelligence are very, very helpful indeed and I know that 
I and Bill Perry are going to take steps to make sure that all of 
those are implemented, let me also say that I think that, if I put 
it in my own terms is the Downing report, here's a point on which 
I would categorically say Bill Perry and I are exactly in the same 


place, the Downing report clearly makes the remark which I think 
is correct, that there was no intelligence failure here. That there 
was strategic warning, that there was threats in Saudi Arabia, and 
indeed to Khobar Towers. 

What I want to say is that our intelligence was not perfect. There 
was not tactical intelligence or information about the timing, cir- 
cumstances of a bomb attack. Our intelligence was not that good. 
Now, how do you make the strategic intelligence turn into protec- 
tion, which goes to the heart of your question. And there I think 
there are some steps that have to be taken to make it better, and 
the particular model that I would mention to you is the creation 
of what we call a J-2X in the area, similar to what is currently op- 
erating in Bosnia, and operating successfully in Bosnia, where you 
have the ability to introduce the results of the Counterterrorism 
Center and human intelligence directly into the military operations 
in the area. And that is the way that I think we can go improving 
better the connection between strategic intelligence and getting the 
operating commanders aware in taking the force protection meas- 
ures that are indicated. I think that that's responsive. I hope it's 
responsive to where your question is. Senator. You do have to do 
more to translate our strategic intelligence to action on the ground. 

Senator Cohen. Not entirely. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Just 
let me make one quick observation. We have been told as a Com- 
mittee, both this Committee, Armed Services Committee, I assume 
Foreign Relations Committee, that terrorism is not only the wave 
of the future, it's the wave of the present. And yet, yesterday, dur- 
ing a presentation to the Armed Services Committee, Secretary 
Perry indicated we have to have a radical re-thinking of force pro- 
tection. Now, I don't understand why it has to be radical re-think- 
ing about force protection when we've been told, and your budgets 
have been funded, based upon the representations to this Commit- 
tee, that terrorism is here, now and for the likely and foreseeable 
future. And only now we're talking about a radical re-thinking, and 
I don't frankly understand why it's taken us so long to get to the 
point we have to be radical in our re-thinking, given the nature of 
the threat. But I'll pursue that later. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Specter. All right, thank you. Senator Cohen. 

I, too, will pick up on the next round, in light of the 12,000 
pound bomb in Beirut in 1983. That's a very important question 
which we will come to later in the hearing. 

And next in order of arrival was Senator Lugar. 

Senator LuGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Deutch, in the meeting the President had with Congres- 
sional leaders, it appeared to me that some temporary fixes of the 
problem were being made pending heavy negotiation with our al- 
lies, the rebuilding of the alliance. 

And that's certainly appropriate, but I'm wondering about three 
things which have been taken for granted generally for awhile, 
namely that the United States, Europe, Japan would have a de- 
pendence upon oil in the Middle East, that this is a growing de- 
pendence, due to greater usage around the world, without cor- 
responding changes in our policy with regard to substitution, mov- 
ing away from oil. In other words, one of the givens is that this is 


very important to us, because we're going to be dependent upon the 
area for a long time. 

The second given is that although, as you say, things would be 
immeasurably better for the Iraqi people, probably for the neigh- 
borhood, if Saddam Hussein were displaced, it has not been an ob- 
jective of our country or of a broader alliance, to replace him. 

And the third point is that the territorial integrity of Iraq is im- 
portant, even though this was an artificially contrived country to 
begin with. And for some reason, sometimes the argument is made 
that because of Iran close by, it's necessary to have an Iraq, at 
least in its current composition, although some are arguing in 
scholarly circles that it might be a good idea to see Iraq in smaller 
pieces. That if, in fact, we are concerned about the difficulties of 
Saddam, quite apart from whoever might follow him, it might be 
useful to have much less to worry about. 

In your judgment, how can the President or anybody begin to put 
together a comprehensive thought about these situations? First, the 
oil dependence? Secondly, if we are dependent, how do we change 
the situation so it is not inordinately expensive to keep making 
temporary fixes when each of these challenges come? And as you 
have predicted, they will come frequently, due to the nature of the 
regime and the fact that we are really unprepared in a total alli- 
ance to make a difference. Can you comment about all of the 

Director Deutch. Senator Lugar, I am not here from the Depart- 
ment of State. I used to be at the Department of Energy. So I'm 
going to take on the oil question, not the others. 

Let me say to you that I think it is quite possible at great cost 
and some tremendous adjustment that the United States might be 
able to do with much less imported oil. But the issue about oil de- 
pendency in the Middle East is not just a United States question, 
it is a global question of all of our allies. So while you can imagine 
us taking these steps on substitution because we are fortunate in 
the natural resources that we have — although it would be very 
costly and difficult to do — it would be impossible for — or unimagi- 
nable for Japan or Germany or France or many other countries to 
do it. So we have to look at the oil dependency question on a global 
basis, not just on an American basis. 

And I want to stress that point to you, that the dependency on 
Middle Eastern oil is a reality that as an alliance we have to live 
with. We should do everything that we can to conserve energy, ev- 
erjrthing we can to move to substitutes. But the fact is that there's 
a political reality of the global dependence on Middle Eastern oil 
for the foreseeable future. 

Senator LuGAR. Precisely on that point, in this current situation, 
do the Europeans, the Japanese share our urgency with regard to 
what is occurring? In other words, if we were to say strategically 
we're prepared to let you folks work it out, we're out of this ball 
game. We'll deal with Venezuela or Mexico or so forth. In other 
words, the seriousness with which the rest of the world is ap- 
proaching this is somewhat suspect, given the precise analysis that 
you've given. And it is incumbent upon our President and our dip- 
lomats to bring that seriousness to the fore, so that there is not so 
much quibbling by allies about whether we are going it alone or 


unilaterally the President is doing this or that. This has occurred, 
I'm sure, to you and the President. But can you comment again, 
why aren't we impressing upon people their problem here? 

Director Deutch. I'm just an intelligence officer, but I agree with 
you. I mean, there you are. I mean, it's — I do not — I mean, the ini- 
tial reactions in foreign capitals to this action by Saddam Hussein 
was a little shocking. 

Senator LuGAR. They're incredible — incredible in terms of their 
national interests. 

Director Deutch. I accept that. I accept that. 

Senator LuGAR. Yes. 

Director DEUTCH. Let me turn to your next question briefly. 
What I said was not a statement about U.S. policy, sir. That's not 
my business. I made an intelligence judgment that there will not 
be stability in the region or an improvement in the circumstances 
of the Iraqi people, which I tried to suggest by giving you a few 
illustrations is abysmal. Until there's a change in that regime, 
there will not be improved stability in the region. 

Now the third point you mentioned is a very important point, 
and that is about the territorial integrity and the likelihood and 
the pros and cons of it. I think that most informed observers from 
almost all parts of the political spectrum on this — I don't mean do- 
mestically, but I mean in the region and elsewhere — believe that 
the long-term security of the region and stability is best — is best 
protected if the territorial integrity of Iraq is retained. And I think 
it would be hard to make an argument that breaking up Iraq, as 
an academic matter, if made in academic circles, would lead to a 
greater likelihood of political stability in the region. That's my own 
analytic judgment on that, sir. 

Senator Lugar. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much. Senator Lugar. 

General Downing has arrived, and I'm going to excuse myself for 
a few moments to talk to him in the back room. And I'm going to 
yield now to our distinguished Vice Chairman, Senator Kerrey. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
will hold my questioning actually and just go down the list in order 
of arrival and turn to Senators who were here before I was. Sen- 
ator Shelby is next on the list. 

Senator Shelby. Thank you. 

Director Deutch, I realize you're not here from the State Depart- 
ment, and I think that's something that should have been said, and 
you said it well. But not only in the Intelligence Community, but 
all over America and probably the world, people are really con- 
cerned about the reports coming out of Iraq. This has been going 
on a long time. Iraq, with Saddam Hussein as its leader, does 
something. We react to it. We slap him around. Then we move on. 
But nothing centrally is done. Now, I know you don't make the pol- 
icy, but you are involved in the intelligence gathering in a big way. 

We see, as you well know, that our coalition, or so-called coali- 
tion, is falling apart. This is not the same coalition with the same 
aims that we had five years ago, it doesn't seem to me. You see 
Egypt and Syria and even the Saudis with a little bit different atti- 
tude than they had. You also see France with a different attitude. 


Are we basically unilaterally involved here? It seems that way to 
me and a lot of people. 

Director Deutch. Well, Senator, let me first of all say that I 
don't think we're unilaterally involved there. 

Senator Shelby. Define what you mean. 

Director Deutch. I don't believe that our closest allies and coali- 
tion partners really are prepared to say that we shouldn't proceed 
in this direction. But let me — let me say, leadership always puts 
you out there a little bit. 

But let me say something about the coalition falling apart. I 
think we've seen a noticeable change in attitude, both in the re- 
gional capitals and in the European capitals as this thing has 
evolved. It is true that the original reaction in the European and 
regional capitals quite differentiated — they're all different — but 
they had a lot more skepticism than I think the American people 
had or certainly than I would have had about Saddam Hussein's 
aggression and what should be done about it. 

One reason is that the states in the south and others don't see 
the Kurds as a central problem that we do. We have much more 
sympathy for the Kurds than others do. 

Secondly, there has been a growth in Arab sentiment for Saddam 
Hussein, and it made difficulties for certain of the Arab govern- 
ments to respond publicly and forcefully in support of our position. 

Senator Shelby. And that makes it difficult for us, too, doesn't 

Director Deutch. Absolutely, it makes it difficult. But I want to 
say, a lot of progress has been made. Secretary Perry's trip to the 
region has had a pronounced effect. You see the Kuwait's willing- 
ness to accept 3,500 additional troops to bring up one brigade 
there. Bahrain has accepted. So there's some evidence of a greater 
willingness for them to be publicly supportive. 

Turkey — Turkey, which is a very important part of this problem, 
was clearly engaging with Saddam. That's one of the reasons that 
I referenced early as causing this. Turkey is, because of its chang- 
ing government, is likely to move toward greater exploration of re- 
lationships with the Islamic states in general. But having seen 
what happened in the north, I think Turkey is now also reconsider- 
ing what it means. So, while I agree with you that the original re- 
action of the coalition, both in the region and Europe, was not as 
strong and supportive as we would have expected, I think you do 
see a change there to be more supportive. Aiid nevertheless, we're 
still out there being the leaders, and that is true. 

Senator Shelby. Well, I understand that, but is it the feeling in 
the area — Syria, Egypt, Turkey and others — maybe that they be- 
lieve that Saddam Hussein has got staying power, perhaps he's 
going to stay around and they're going to have to deal with him? 
Whether they want to — in other words, the Devil is going to sur- 

Director Deutch. Senator, we have to see that he has survived 
for six years. 

Senator Shelby. Absolutely. 

Director Deutch. And therefore, I think that there is exactly 
that sense that he is going to be there for a while, and no political 
opposition in his own country has been permitted to emerge. Our 

37 - 434 - 97 - 2 


other efforts have not been successful. So, yes, the answer is I 
think they do think he's going to survive. 

Senator Shelby. My time is up. 

Vice Chairman KERREY. Senator Johnston. 

Senator Johnston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Deutch, history is replete, as you know, with 
misjudgments by governments of our intentions or the intentions of 
other governments, which lead to disaster, wars, et cetera, and par- 
ticularly that's true in Iraq, where I think that Saddam Hussein 
saw the statements of our ambassador as maybe a wink and a nod 
that he could invade Kuwait. And I'm very concerned that we are 
not being clear as to what our intentions are; that by making vague 
threats and then not following through we lead to a state of confu- 

Now, my own view is that we have no vital interest with the 
Kurds; that Saddam Hussein is not likely to have a reliable ally 
in Brazani, nor are we likely to have an enemy forever in Talabani; 
that Kurdistan cannot be under the control of anybody, whether it's 
the Turks or the Iranians or Iraq; and that we need to be more 
clear in what we are stating about what we're prepared to do. I 
think we overstated to the Kurds, made them think that we were 
likely to come to their aid. And then when push came to shove, we 
didn't. It was sort of like Hungary in 1956. 

Now, my question is this. Shouldn't we state with more precision 
and follow through with more precision, as to what we intend to 
do in Iraq, which to me ought to be total containment; not state 
that we're going to remove Saddam when we don't have the tools 
to do so; not state that we're going to do anything heroic like send 
in troops to the Kurds. But just make very clear that we're going 
to protect Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and those things that are our 
vital interest. My question is, do you agree with that? And 
shouldn't we really state those goals with more precision? 

Director Deutch. Senator, I really am not — my position does not 
permit me to give a reaction to that point. I am not in the policy- 
making business. You have to ask that question to Secretary Chris- 

Senator Johnston. Well, let me state it in another way. Hasn't — 
what I see is somewhat imprecision in what we've stated, hasn't it 
led to some untoward results? I mean, haven't the Kurds, Talabani 
particularly, hasn't he been disappointed? I mean, you've got both 
sides there that are mad at us now, both the KPC and the PUK, 
and they're both mad at us. 

Director DEUTCH. Well, I don't think that that's correct. I don't 
think the KDP is mad at us. We weren't the ones who called up 
Saddam Hussein and asked for help in occupying Erbil. It was Mr. 
Barzani. In fact, Mr. Barzani is urgently asking for our assistance 
to make sure that he doesn't become too dependent on Saddam 

So — but the broader policy questions that you raised, they're le- 
gitimate questions to raise. I'm just the wrong person to spit out 
an answer to you, which I — I mean, I have it, but 

Senator Johnston. Well, tell me about the Kurds. Is anybody 
likely to control the Kurds and have them as a reliable ally wheth- 
er it's Iraq or us, or anybody? 


Director Deutch. Right now, they're divided among themselves 
in several different groups. So they're not in the position of being 
a reliable ally in the sense that you mean. The issue really is, are 
they an important part of containment of Saddam Hussein. I would 
argue that just in your terms, that if you want to take a policy of 
containing Saddam Hussein and making sure that he does not in- 
vade or threaten Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, where our vital interests 
do lie — we certainly agree on that — that involving the Kurds and 
our engaging the Kurds, other coalition members engaging the 
Kurds, is an important part of achieving that result. 

Senator Johnston. All right. But engaging the Kurds and hav- 
ing a policy that says we're going to make alliances with one of the 
Kurds with a view to overthrowing Saddam Hussein is two dif- 
ferent things. And I think the latter is what we've tried to do, and 
it has led to disappointment in the Kurds and it's a vastly unsuc- 
cessful policy. Am I not correct on that? 

Director Deutch. I don't want to reply to — I mean I'm not — I 
should not be commenting on policy matters other than those 
which involve intelligence or energy. But okay. 

Senator Johnston. I see my time is about up. 

Director Deutch. I'm sorry, sir. 

Senator Johnston. But you can relay my concerns, for whatever 
weight they have, to those who make the policy. 

Director Deutch. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Johnston. 

Senator Bryan. 

Senator Bryan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, notwithstanding our best of intentions, it seems to me 
that in terms of survivability, that Saddam Hussein is rapidly be- 
coming the Fidel Castro of the region. In other words, Castro has 
survived nine Presidential Administrations. Is there any realistic 
likelihood, based upon any of the intelligence information that we 
have available to us, that he is likely to be displaced by any inter- 
nal factors that are currently in evidence in Iraq or that you know 
of? I'm not asking you to disclose what those might be publicly, but 
if you can share a conclusion. 

Director Deutch. Senator, there is an essential quality about 
Saddam Hussein that is different than other long lived totalitarian 
leaders, and that is that he is actively threatening his neighbors 
militarily through invasion. I mean this person is likely — would 
like to invade and take back Kuwait which he regards as a prov- 
ince of Iraq. So we have to remember this person is out to invade 
his neighbors and 

Senator Bryan. Let me just say, Mr. Deutch, I certainly was not 
trying to imply any support or to indicate that he is some benign 
presence in the region. My question is focused upon your realistic 
assessment in terms of the intelligence data available to you, is 
there any reason for us to believe that he is in the near term of 
the foreseeable future to be toppled by any internal factions that 
might exist in Iraq? 

Director Deutch. My answer to that would be nuanced, but I 
cannot tell you that I predict it in the near term. But I would have 
a more nuanced answer to that in a closed session. 


Senator BRYAN. I believe it was Senator Cohen raised the ques- 
tion about the presence of additional American military forces in 
Kuwait and whether they may be at risk as a result of any domes- 
tic reaction to an American military presence, and I think your an- 
swer was essentially that you did not see that. 

My question, in light of the hearing that we had yesterday in the 
Armed Services Committee, where I agreed with the conclusion 
that you and others have made, that there was no intelligence fail- 
ure with respect to what happened at the Khobar Towers. It is my 
view, reinforced by the Downing report, that what we had was a 
command failure in the field. That is, that there was enough infor- 
mation, although not site specific, combined with the Riyadh ter- 
rorist attack the previous November, that should have alerted the 
military commanders in the field to take much stronger action to 
protect American military forces. My question, Mr. Deutch, is, are 
you satisfied that the framework that exists in Kuwait in terms of 
receiving the intelligence information that you make available to 
our American military commanders, is adequate from a structure 
to alert them to take whatever timely action any intelligence data 
you all may have that might suggest at some future point in time 
that there may be a problem that requires them to take more ag- 
gressive action? 

Director Deutch. I'm absolutely, 100 percent with Bill Perry on 
this. We are going to make sure that every — and this is not since 
the Downing report, but this is since the event itself. 

Senator Bryan. Yes. 

Director Deutch. And we have taken steps, seven precise steps 
to strength the capability of local military forces in the region on 
force protection and to make good use of whatever warning, what- 
ever intelligence is present to protect US forces. 

So the answer to your question is yes. 

Senator Bryan. I think that's very important, because it seems 
to me that with rather modest efforts — applying the mylar coating 
to the exterior glass surfaces, to reposition the fence, to move some 
of our personnel to the interior — that we could have perhaps avert- 
ed all of the fatalities, certainly reduced the casualties substan- 
tially. And I think that structure is very important. 

And I reiterate, although there have been some reports in the 
news in the aftermath of the Khobar Towers bombing that there 
may have been an intelligence failure, I don't think the record sup- 
ports that position. I believe that the intelligence information was 
sufficient to have charged the commanders with notice. 

Let me ask you a question, and maybe you can help us under- 
stand, or at least help me understand that. We talk about our con- 
cerns from a policy point of view of a vacuum being created in the 
north. Share with us from an intelligence perspective, assume hy- 
pothetically — and I acknowledge this is totally unlikely to occur — 
what if there were an independent Kurdistan that sometime in the 
future arose in the northern region? Is that contrary to our best in- 
terest? Why do we have this concern about some type of an inde- 
pendent or more autonomous presence of a Kurdish — if not a state 
at least a Kurdish regional presence? 

Director Deutch. In order to form an independent Kurdistan, 
you would not only take territory from Iraq, you'd need to take ter- 


ritory from Iran, Turkey and Syria to put together such a region. 
I think that everybody looks at the necessary political difficulties 
in accomplishing that, each one representing a very significant, dif- 
ferent situation, is to say that it would create more uncertainty, 
more insecurity, especially with respect to Turkey — and well, all of 
those countries — that it looks like it's just better to try and make 
sure there is sensible autonomy and peace and protection for those 

Senator Bryan. Director, thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you. Senator Bryan. 

Senator Robb. 

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Deutch, good to see you again. 

Toward the end of your opening statement you made a state- 
ment, something to the effect that no stability will be achieved 
until the Saddam regime has been replaced. Would you expand just 
a bit on the consequences of a different regime? And specifically, 
if you will, address the regional balance that we so often refer to 
between Iran and Iraq in terms of what the role of Iraq has to be 
vis a vis Iran in your judgment to maintain the kind of regional 
stability that many of the people who concern themselves with that 
regime believe has to be maintained. 

Director Deutch. Senator, I think we saw over a decade of where 
there was a balance between Iraq and Iran. I mean, there was, in 
fact a major war which Iraq did very well at in the — I guess the 
early '80s. My view is that the integrity of Iraq is important, for 
one of the reasons because it does form a military balance to Iran 
in the region. But the regime has to also pay attention to not 
threatening its southern neighbors. And also to pay some attention 
to the character of how they treat people, whether it's Kurds or 

Senator Robb. I'm not quarreling with that. Indeed, I agree with 
it entirely. What I was asking you to focus on the difference be- 
tween a post-Saddam regime in Iraq in terms of the balance be- 
tween the two, and what would happen, in effect, say if Saddam, 
for whatever reasons through whatever means were to be removed 
or were to relinquish power in whatever form, what is the essential 
difference in the dynamics of the region that take place that are 
not present with Saddam in power? In other words how much does 
his regime specifically mean to the balance, and what happens if 
he's not there, just with respect to the balance? 

Director Deutch. I don't believe that the kind of regime that 
Saddam runs is essential to preserving that balance. You could 
have a very different kind of government, much more democratic 
and still maintain a defense and a military capability that would 
be able to balance Iran. 

What we expect to have in a subsequent regime to Saddam Hus- 
sein in one that does not threaten his neighbors to the south; one 
that does not pursue weapons of mass destruction; one that does 
not go out and kill thousands of citizens; and has the benefit of ex- 
porting, I guess 2.5 million barrels of oil a day, which would allow 
him to improve his economic circumstances. That's what I think 
one is looking for in a subsequent regime. 


Senator ROBB. Well, let me just ask you one question about Sad- 
dam himself. We all take turns speculating about what he'll do. 
And we normally get egg on our face if we go out on a limb. And 
we speculate about how long he'll last. And we tend to make mis- 
takes, ultimately, in that kind of a judgment. What do you believe 
is the source of his staying power? Is it an appeal to nationalism? 
Is it tyranny? Is it the way that he plays off against the west? I 
mean, he's representative of a minority faction in Iraq. He's got a 
significant population as you've referred to — the Sunnis to the 
south and the Kurds to the north. How is it that he manages to 
survive the perils of Pauline repeatedly in what would appear to 
be a course fraught with too much peril for most other mortal 
human beings? 

Director Deutch. Well, he maintains his internal control, Sen- 
ator Robb, by perhaps one of the most ruthless and efficient re- 
gimes that I know about. He uses his own family, the Tikriti family 
to do it. And he does it by absolutely ruthless suppression, so that 
anyone who is ever suspected or known to have uttered a different 
word is executed, sometimes in the most brutal ways. So, this is 
a very, very efficient person with an internal — a very strong inter- 
nal security service who has — takes — there's no atrocity that he 
won't commit to keep himself in power. And that's the way he does 

Internationally, he has been only once threatened by a coalition. 
That was at the time of the Gulf War. It would have toppled him, 
as you know, if the war had gone on a little bit longer. 

Senator ROBB. What about the effects of sanctions at this point 
on Saddam's regime and his ability to maintain that equilibrium of 
terror within his own country and the threat he poses to those out- 
side his borders? 

Director Deutch. I think the sanctions have clearly — I mean, as 
the beginning of my statement indicated — completely made the 
Iraqi people in the Iraqi country not be able to enjoy any improve- 
ments in their standard of living. I think it has a tremendous ef- 

Senator ROBB. But with respect to Saddam's own hold on power? 

Director DEUTCH. On dissident tribal groups, on hopefully over 
time, some of the leadership who is not terrified of being caught, 
that it will lead them to understand the importance of seeking a 
political change. 

So, I do think that the sanctions have the effect inside of Iraq, 
pointing toward greater likelihood of his being replaced. They don't 
strengthen him in any way. By themselves they may not be suffi- 
cient, but they are very important. 

Senator Robb. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director DEUTCH. Senator Robb, if I could only add one other 

Senator RoBB. Yes. 

Director Deutch. If there were not sanctions and he was doing 
well economically, he would also find a way to improve his military 
circumstances, which would not be in our interests to the south. 

Senator ROBB. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you. Senator Robb. 


Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Deutch, I hope you'll forgive all of us here because there 
is a propensity to ask you questions that are outside of your imme- 
diate position since you've been in the other positions. And I have 
three questions to ask, two of which may fall into that category. 

First of all, in response to your question — I believe it was from 
Senator Cohen when he asked the question, what do you think the 
chances are of Saddam Hussein invading Kuwait. You said, quote, 
"At present very low." Did you mean the chances are very low that 
he'd do it at present or at present it doesn't look like it will happen 
at sometime in the future. 

Director Deutch. Senator Inhofe, he has shown in the past, as 
he did, I think, in October of '94 of moving two divisions down 
there, we keep track of that quite precisely. He has the capability 
of doing it at any time, so we do not see any indications today that 
he is moving towards the south. We have not of course seen it for 
some period of time, but tomorrow we could gain information to 
show he's moving there. So it's a question of his intentions. He's 
got the capability of doing it whenever he wants. 

Senator Inhofe. Okay. 

That leads me to the second question when you mention capabil- 
ity, Mr. Director. I don't remember the exact words, but I recall 
some time ago that Saddam had made a statement that if he had 
waited five years to make his invasion of Kuwait, he would have 
been in a better position. Whether he's talking about nuclear capa- 
bility, conventional capability or missile technology, I'm not sure. 
But I would ask a two-part question. First of all, do you believe — 
how do you think his capability in terms of force strength and mili- 
tary capability is today relative to the time that he invaded Ku- 
wait? Aiid then secondly, the second part of that question would be 
how does that relate to our force strength, since we are now at 
about roughly 50 percent of where we had been in terms of Army 
divisions, in terms of Air Force wings. We are not as capable as we 
were in 1991. So, a two-part question. 

Director DEUTCH. First of all, with respect to his military capa- 
bility, it is significantly reduced, both in quality and quantity, com- 
pared to the posture he had in 1990, before DESERT SHIELD. I 
would say that as a rough — a very rough rule of thumb, less than 
half of his capability in terms of armored personnel carriers, tanks, 
artillery tubes, or aircraft even less than that. In readiness also, 
less. So I would say he is, while still a formidable regional power, 
it's significantly less than he had in 1990. 

In contrast, I would say that the deployment of US forces — and 
here I'm again, I'm not quite the right person to answer this, but 
let me just say, I would just tell you — is incredibly much better 
postured in terms of the number of aircraft, deployed ships, 
prepositioned equipment, a whole series of measures to respond 
very, very quickly indeed. 

So, the balance of power compared to 1990 in terms of today 
would be very much in terms of the coalition's favor as a mihtary 
matter. In terms of response time, quality of weapons and the abil- 
ity to bring on sophisticated intelligence support and accurate air 


delivered munitions, it's thoroughly in the coalition's favor com- 
pared to 1990. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I understand that, in the balance of 
power. I guess what I'm 

Director Deutch. In the region. In the region. 

Senator Inhofe. In the region. But if I remember correctly at the 
time — let's just take the Army divisions that we had available — we 
used 42 percent of our capacity in the Persian Gulf War. And in 
our reduced capability today that would equate to about 70 percent. 
And so, I guess what I'm getting at is 

Director Deutch. A complicated calculation. We had a very large 
deployment in 1990. As I said, his force structure is less than half 
what it was. 

Senator iNHOFE. Yes. 

Director Deutch. The difference and mix of air and ground is en- 
tirely different. I'm not — this is a question for General 
Shalikashvili, but generally my impression would be we are in 
much, much stronger relative military shape than we were at that 
time. And by the way, we had not much trouble in dealing with the 
problem then. 

Senator iNHOFE. I suspect you answered my third question before 
I arrived. And if you have, I'll just get it out of the record. But the 
media has characterized the damage inflicted to Iraq all the way 
from a pin prick to some devastation. How would you — what per- 
centage of the missiles do you believe reached their targets? And 
how would you assess and characterize the damage that was in- 
flicted to Iraq on September 3 and September 4? 

Director Deutch. The estimates of the actual damage is a battle 
damage assessment which is really a military function and I would 
defer entirely to the J-2 and to Shall on that matter. 

But let me tell you where I think that we underestimate the ef- 
fect and that is in the movement of this no-fly zone from 32 north 
to 33 north. That has significantly constrained and taken sov- 
ereignty away from Saddam Hussein. It has taken away some of 
his best training bases. It's told him he can't deploy aircraft down 
there. It has a significant effect on constraining him and influenc- 
ing the way he sees himself being put more and more into a small 

So, it's not only the direct military damage to which I would ask 
you to address those questions to the Chairman, but also the very, 
very stifling — from his perspective, significant action of moving 
that no-fly zone north. 

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Director. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator DeWine. 

Senator DeWine. No questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Kerrey. 

Vice Chairman KERREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Deutch, it seems to me that, first of all, that what we 
have is a serious conflict between the objective that the allies have 
all agreed to — the containment objective — and the removal objec- 
tive that people have been talking about all the way back to 1991. 
I mean there's pretty, if you ask people in 1991, what's our objec- 
tive, there was an awful lot of rhetoric and a lot of things being 


said about the removal of Saddam Hussein, at that time, and con- 
tinuing all the way up until present day. And my own view is that 
that discussion needs to be pulled into the public arena. I do think 
that we need to start talking about our allies, notwithstanding, 
some potential disagreement, amongst Members of Congress, about 
whether or not that's a worthy objective. 

My own view is if the story's going to be told some day about the 
liberation of Iraq, about how people retreated inside of Iraq, and 
the people of the United States of America are either going to say, 
thank God, we stayed the course and helped produce that libera- 
tion or the story's going to be told that we just walked away from 
it, because we didn't want to do anything. That's my own view. 

And secondly, I think there is likely to be an increased ramping 
up a ballistic capability and a threat from non-conventional weap- 
ons, particularly biological and chemical. So I think there's a rea- 
son for us not to do more than just contain. 

But there's a conflict, and there's been a conflict since 668 au- 
thorized the follow-on operations, conflict between us and our allies 
about what that objective is. And unless and until we can get our 
allies, unless and until we decide if we're going to change — we may 
decide as a country that we're not going to — then it's very difficult, 
it seems to me to expect us to be successful in doing something for 
which we don't have any legal permission to do. And to be clear on 
this, it seems me that there has been substantial success on your 
part, and your predecessor's part as well, providing intelligence of 
all kinds, in order to accomplish the containment mission; that in- 
telligence has enabled us to accomplish the containment mission, 
I think needs to be said up front, particularly since the purpose of 
this hearing is to evaluate intelligence's role in the Iraqi operation. 
That role has been substantial and has provided at key moments 
information to decision-makers, both President Clinton, President 
Bush, that enabled them to rally our allies to continue the consid- 
erable effort that we have in place. 

But to be clear, we write laws here, and though there are some 
people still presuming that if anybody works for the CIA ignores 
a law, you obey the law. And the people that work for you obey the 
law or they pay the price. We have capacity to do that. And, I 
should say parenthetically, I do appreciate as well the willingness 
to take responsibility, demonstrated yesterday by Secretary Perry, 
coming up to the Hill, saying, you know, it's on my watch, I'm re- 
sponsible for it. And that's also unique to our country. 

I understand there's a great deal of confusion about how we 
ought to proceed from here on out in Iraq. But it does seem to me 
to be an odd situation. We have a law that basically says the Unit- 
ed States American can kill every person in Iraq if we want to ex- 
cept Saddam Hussein, you know, and I think that needs to be part 
of our discussion, whether or not that law makes any sense. I 
mean, I'm not advocating it here at the moment, but there does 
seem to be a bit of a disconnect if we conclude that the removal 
of Saddam Hussein ought to be the open objective and we ought 
to try to rally our allies to that cause. 

I mean, I do see a significant importance in doing that for lots 
of reasons. I mean, this whole region, beyond just the Middle East, 
the whole Caspian Sea region that's struggling to try to develop. 


Afghanistan is still a substantial problem, Pakistan is still — and 
this whole problem in Iraq impinges, it seems to me, upon success 
in other areas. And though we may not like to be the strongest 
military, strongest democracy, strongest economy, we are, and I 
share what Senator Lugar said earlier about the need to make sure 
that we apportion the burden fairly amongst allies. But I say to 
you I think it's — it's going to be difficult for the Intelligence Com- 
munity to accomplish its objective if we have a conflict in the objec- 
tive, the open objective, between ourselves and our allies. And I 
think we unquestionably do when it comes to Iraq. 

Senator INHOFE. What's the answer? 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. I'm done. No question. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you, Senator Kerrey. 

Director Deutch, picking up on Senator Cohen's ending comment 
about Secretary Perry's statement about the need for radical re- 
thinking of force protection, and Senator Cohen was saying wheth- 
er or not that is true, because we have known for a long time that 
terrorism is the warfare of choice for some at the present time, Sec- 
retary Perry's cover letter to the President of the Downing task 
force report referred to a 20,000 pound bomb, and there has been 
some comment that perhaps that size is mentioned because there 
could be no defense as to a 20,000 pound bomb. But that is at vari- 
ance with what the Defense Department initially said a bomb of 
three to five thousand pounds, and what the Downing task force 
said a bomb of three to eight thousand, with a probability of its 
being a five thousand pound bomb. 

Senator Cohen. If you would yield, Mr. Chairman. He also indi- 
cated yesterday that a 250 or 280 pound bomb would have caused 
substantial damage where it went off, so it was not necessarily the 
size that was determinative but the location of where it went. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, that is correct. There had been an as- 
sessment that there would have been quite a number of deaths if 
there had been a 250 pound bomb, the same size as in Riyadh on 
November 13th of last year because of the closeness of the building, 
which raises the issue of the fence. And let me just digress on that 
for a moment. 

I visited Khobar Towers and the building 131 was less than 60 
feet from the fence. And ranking Pentagon officials had been in the 
area, although they had not inspected Khobar Towers, which is a 
little surprising since Khobar Towers was one of the three primary 
targets which had been in the intelligence force reports. So that 
having the perimeter so close and knowing of the danger wouldn't 
have taken a bomb of enormous magnitude, as Senator Cohen is 
pointing out by his interjection, at that point. 

But coming back to the size of the bomb, the 20,000 pound bomb 
might raise a suggestion that you can't defend at all, but that ap- 
pears to be contradicted on all fronts by what DOD said earlier — 
the Department of Defense — three to five thousand pounds — by 
what the Downing Commission said — 3,000 to 8,000 with the prob- 
ability of its being 5,000. 

Immediately after the Khobar Tower incident. Secretary Perry 
said that the bomb used at Khobar was ten times the bomb used 
in the Mideast at any time in the future, which is, simply stated, 
not factual since the bomb at Beirut on October 23rd, 1983, killing 


241 Marines was 12,000 pounds as found by the Long Commission. 
And then Secretary Perry, when that was pointed out, said well, 
in Saudi Arabia, but you're in the same region, not quite the same 
neighborhood — internationally really the same neighborhood, so 
that there should be no surprise when you have a bomb in Saudi 
Arabia which is in the range of the bomb in Beirut, which was 
12,000 pounds, although this one does not appear to have been that 

Now, the Downing Commission found that there was no failui 
of intelligence. Secretary Perry had testified on July 9th that thej 
was a failure of intelligence, but the finding of the Downing tas 
force found that there is none. Now, if we are faced now with wh& 
Secretary Perry says is a, quote, "radical rethinking of force protec- 
tion," what does that mean in terms of intelligence? What are we 
supposed to do now with the lesson of Dhahran that we shouldn't 
have done in 1983, 13 years ago, with the virtual identical lesson 
of Beirut? 

Director Deutch. Mr. Chairman, let me first of all say that Bill 
Perry — and I feel quite confident of this — has not said that there 
was a failure in intelligence and does not believe that there was 
a failure of intelligence. I think he 

Chairman Specter. Well, I think that's what he did say on July 
9th before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 

Director Deutch. Let me say that my very clear understanding 
is that Bill Perry does not believe that there was a failure of intel- 

Chairman Specter. Well, I don't know what he believes, but I 
know what he said. 

Director Deutch. Well, if I may, what I might do is — and I don't 
mean to be too argumentative about it — why don't I try to get 
some — examine the statement you made and look at other state- 

But the reason I point to this is not only to — the important point 
here is that I believe that Bill Perry and I have the identical view 
of what the circumstances are on intelligence and the Khobar Tow- 
ers event — that there was sample strategic intelligence, intelligence 
of strategic warning about the threat in Saudi Arabia and to the 
Khobar Towers. What was absent was a connection with the forces 
to take action and also tactical intelligence which told you that 
time and circumstances of attack, which is what we would always 
like to have. 

But I do not believe that there was any difference between what 
Bill Perry or I or the Downing report says about intelligence. 

Chairman Specter. Director Deutch, my time is up, but this is 
going to be the last round. I want to pursue that on one additional 
line. Greneral Downing testified yesterday that the DOD must in- 
vest more in HUMINT, human intelligence, and counterintel- 
ligence, and that's a finding in the Downing Task Force Report, as 
well. Now, we have gone through a very extensive exercise on try- 
ing to reform the Intelligence Community following the incidents of 
Ames and other problems. And we have finally turned out an Intel- 
ligence Authorization Bill, which is a significant improvement, but 
not nearly far enough, in my view, on vesting authority in the Di- 
rector of Central Intelligence to really being the central guy who 


can rattle the cage and really put people on notice that there is a 
tremendous threat, like at Khobar Towers, which wasn't done, not- 
withstanding the Defense Intelligence Agency report eight days be- 
fore on 17, June, which said there needed to be more done at 
Khobar Towers, with a big vibrant picture of all those towers with 
all those people living in one place. 

Now, when the Downing task force says, DOD, Department of 
Defense needs to do more on HUMINT and counterintelligence, we 
still have this divided authority with 85 percent of the intelligence 
budget under the control of the Department of Defense, although 
everybody thinks that the Director of Central Intelligence is really 
in charge and is supposed to be doing the job, and the fingers are 
all pointed at you, Director, when there's an intelligence failure — 
which there wasn't here. But if there is one, but if the Department 
of Defense has all the money, what do we do next? Are we going 
to leave all this with the Department of Defense, where they have 
so many other things to do they can't possibly focus the kind of in- 
telligence that you can as the Director of Central Intelligence? And 
if it's going to remain with the Department of Defense — regrettably 
as the reform measures will, even after this year's intensive ef- 
fort — how do we get the Department of Defense to do their job that 
the Downing task force has called for, and do get more human in- 
telligence and more counterintelligence? 

If the secretary of defense needs to know the time, the date and 
the place — if you know all that it's not much of a problem. Have 
to be a lucky strike to know all that. But if that's what he wants 
before he calls it enough intelligence, what's he going to do next to 
do what the Downing task force calls for? 

Director Deutch. Senator, I believe that the point made by the 
Downing task force, and the particular passage that, or the rec- 
ommendation, that you are referring to is pointing out the need for 
local commanders, whether they're in Bosnia or Kuwait or in Saudi 
Arabia, to have some ability to do counterintelligence for their 
forces locally. Have liaison relationships with the surrounding au- 
thorities so that they know what the local threat is and what the 
local authorities believe. So both in terms of the kind of activities 
that was referred to there and the counterintelligence activities 
that were referred to there, I do believe that that is something 
which the military should do, because it is in my words, organic to 
the deployed forces. 

I might also say that it should be coordinated with the chief of 
station — it should be coordinated with the chief of station, and in 
some sense there is a role to make sure that the Director knows 
the trade craft and other activities, the operations are carried out 
in an effective manner. 

Where the urgent need is to attack terrorism world wide is at the 
strategic level, the capabilities, the intentions, the way these dif- 
ferent terrorist groups operate, so that one is able to deter or inter- 
dict their efforts as a whole. And it is there where I think that the 
authority and the responsibility of the Director of Central Intel- 
ligence, the CIA, is so terribly vital. We have never said that we 
should run — and I don't think anybody's ever advocated — every 
force protection-related intelligence activity which is organic to de- 
ployed forces. I believe that that is a sensible thing for the Depart- 


ment of Defense to do, although I want to tell you that we do 
have — the Director has a responsibility to make sure that it is done 
in a coordinated way with activities in the region and that it is ef- 

Chairman Specter. Well, I thank you for your answer, although 
I'm not sure that I really understand it. If you've got to coordinate 
with the chief of station, the Director of Central Intelligence has 
the responsibility. 

Director Deutch. The chief 

Chairman Specter. This is going to have to be revisited. 

Director Deutch. Yes. 

Chairman SPECTER. I think we're going to have to do a lot more. 
It is true that the Downing task force says, as you represent, Direc- 
tor Deutch, that it has to be done on a local level. But it's also a 
DOD responsibility to develop human intelligence and counter in- 
telligence, and when it comes to the issue of coordination, unless 
you have a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, as you are, you 
have a unique opportunity for that. But I remain convinced that we 
need it under one hat and I think it ought to be your hat. 

Senator Cohen. 

Senator Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

If I could just follow up on this request for better HUMINT. 
There has been no request for additional funding in the Fiscal '97 
budget, so I have to come to several different assumptions. Number 
one, that the Administration is satisfied that there is adequate 
funding for human intelligence. 

Number two, there has been perhaps a misallocation of the fund- 
ing, of the levels of funding they currently have. But it seems to 
me that they can't suggest we need more HUMINT with the impli- 
cation being let's have more money or let's have more personnel in 
order to get more human intelligence. 

Secondly, I think it's highly unlikely given the region that we're 
talking about, that more human intelligence is going to give you 
tactical intelligence in the sense that Specter was talking about 
time, place, date. Saddam Hussein is not going to send a registered 
letter to the Secretary of Defense saying we're coming. And so the 
notion that somehow we have to rely upon tactical intelligence, 
that would have in fact helped prevent this, I think is not going 
to occur, it's very unlikely. 

So, that's a matter we ought to explore, I think, with General 
Downing, Mr. Chairman. I cannot understand why he is not being 
allowed to testify in open session before this Committee. But if we 
have to have it in closed session, we shall do so in closed session. 

I'd also like to follow up the question that — Senator Lugar is not 
here right now but I assume members of his staff may be, or at 
least it can be communicated to him. He raised an interesting 
question about isn't it ironic and the reaction of our allies where 
they in fact are far more reliant upon Mideastem oil than we are — 
Persian Gulf oil. As a matter of fact, it's even more ironic that 
China, which will eventually become a major consumer of energy, 
principally from the Persian Gulf region, is also supplying Silk- 
worms and submarines to Iran, holding out the potential for a con- 
flict in that region and making the possibility it could be shut 


down, shutting off that supply of energy, that they will then have 
to call upon sometime in the future. 

But Senator Lugar raised the issue saying why don't we just let 
the alliance go it alone and let's see how they would handle it. I 
recall during the Persian Gulf debate on Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm the big slogan was "No Blood for Oil." But of course, that's 
precisely the decision that has been made over the years, hasn't it, 
that it is blood for oil. We are stationing our men and women in 
that region in order to protect oil supplies. We are putting their 
blood on the line in order to protect access to oil for ourselves and 
for our allies. 

And what you have is a situation that domestic policy is actually 
driving our foreign policy. If we were to present a choice to the 
American people saying you don't like the prospect of having your 
sons and daughters put their lives on the line in that region, would 
you be willing to return to a conservation ethic for energy, for ex- 
ample? How about a 55 mile per hour speed limit? What about 
smaller cars? Would you consider a 50 cent gas tax, not a five cent 
gas tax, but how about a 50 cent gas tax. Would you be prepared 
to pay for increased prices from Mexico or Venezuela? Would you 
ever consider recreating the synfuels corporation in order to do syn- 
thetic fuels, Mr. Department of Energy Secretary. Or how about 
nuclear power as a substitute for oil and gas? 

So these are options that we could, in fact, explore and put those 
to the American people saying are you prepared to make changes 
in your lifestyle or perhaps the sources of energy or, indeed, the 
conservation and reduction of our consumption. 

The fact is — and I'm proposing this, I'm not asking it as a ques- 
tion, I'm making a statement — the fact is if we were to say let the 
allies handle it, number one, they don't have the military capabil- 
ity. Number two, if they had the military capability, they have 
never, to my knowledge, expressed an interest in exercising that 
military capability in that region. And in all likelihood they would 
probably cut a deal with whomever assumed power in the region 
for whatever price they could get, pay any price they could get for 
the energy itself. 

And there's another little factor involved, it's called the State of 
Israel. I wonder what Israel's response would be if we say, we're 
out of here. We're letting the British, the Germans, the French, the 
Japanese, handle the supplies of energy coming through the Per- 
sian Gulf. I doubt very much whether Israel would sit back and 
just watch the diplomacy unfold under their leadership. 

Mr. Chairman, a simple question, I guess. Are we better off 
today than we were four years ago? We're asking that domestically, 
politically. Is Saddam Hussein better off today than he was four 
weeks ago? 

Director Deutch. Mr. Chairman, I want to — first of all, I need 
your protection from his attacks on energy. 

But let me go back and 

Chairman Specter. As soon as I can find an attack, I'll be glad 
to give you protection. [General laughter.] 

Director Deutch. Let me go back to the first point. I will come 
to the last point in a moment. In your own words, dollars don't do 
the thing in HUMINT. We do have a constant budget for all of our 


HUMINT intelligence activities, as you know. The fraction which 
has been allocated to counter-terrorism is hugely up. I also want 
to tell you, and you know better than I, that we are in position 
where we are strengthening our HUMINT intelligence collection 
capability. I believe it's vital. I've worked very hard on it. And I be- 
lieve that it's getting better. You can't measure it in dollars. And 
I would be delighted to provide you and other Members of the Com- 
mittee with the evidence that we are doing a better job than 3 
years ago and that we are allocating a bigger fraction because of 
the changed threat to counterterrorism, and that it's paying off. It's 
not dollars alone. 

You're absolutely right about tactical intelligence. It would be 
wonderful to be able to have intelligence which could tell you the 
time, circumstances of a terrorist attack. But it is very difficult to 
do. We do do that from time to time. We have done that, but we 
can't count on it, and it's still more of a goal than a certainty. And 
I can't promise and no one can promise that. 

Finally, is Saddam Hussein better off now than he was 4 years 

Senator CoHEN. No, no, no. Four weeks ago. 

Director Deutch. Four weeks ago? 

Senator Cohen. Right. 

Director Deutch. Yes. 

Senator Cohen. He's better off than he was. 

Director DEUTCH. In terms of his regional posture, he's better off 
than he was 6 weeks ago. That's why 

Senator Cohen. The reason I ask that question is because the 
President has claimed victory in terms of our action in that region, 
and I've been trying to assess in terms of our relative position, vis- 
a-vis Saddam Hussein, as to how we can claim such a victory. We 
can point to the south and say, yes, we've moved up our no-fly zone 
a degree in the south. We have, perhaps, inhibited his ability to 
move his armor aggressively to the south, into Kuwait, or possibly 
Saudi Arabia. But in terms of his position within Iraq itself, his re- 
lationship with his own people, the splintering of the alliance and 
the coalition to date, plus his consolidation of power in an area that 
he was precluded from as recently as 4 weeks ago, it would be hard 
to claim anything but a Pyrrhic victory in Iraq. And I am glad to 
see that you agree with that assessment. 

Director Deutch. I certainly don't agree with the way you stated 
it, but let me say why is he stronger today than he was 6 weeks 
ago. In part, it's because of a change in Turkish policy, which I be- 
lieve they may well rethink shortly when they see what the con- 
sequences have been. In part, it has been the continual feuding be- 
tween the Kurdish people. In part, it has been a willingness among 
our European allies with a containment strategy. Those are all the 
reasons that have pointed to it. But I think that it is not possible 
to argue that he is not stronger today then he was 6 weeks ago. 
And I think that's very bad. 

Chairman SPECTER. Director Deutch, last question. 

Senator DeWine, would you like to go on? 

Last question. When Senator Cohen asked you is Saddam Hus- 
sein stronger today than he was 4 years ago 

Senator Cohen. No, 4 weeks ago. 


Chairman Specter. I know, I know. 

Senator COHEN. I asked 4 weeks ago. 

Chairman Specter. When Senator Cohen asked you 4 weeks 
ago, you thought he said 4 years ago, and you started to pause on 
as you rephrased what you thought his question was at 4 years 
ago, and you were pausing then when he clarified it or corrected 
and specified it at 4 weeks, you were very snappy in saying yes, 
he's stronger than he was 4 weeks ago, or 6, as you later said. 

But let me go back to the question of 4 years ago, on the general- 
ized context of is he getting stronger? It is amazing, in a sense, 
that we have the ban on purchases of oil, and we have a lot of con- 
straints on Saddam Hussein, but he's able to muster quite a mili- 
tary presence and quite a military force. Is Saddam Hussein grow- 
ing stronger? We had this question raised before in our meeting 
with the President 2 days ago, and we had an answer from the Sec- 
retary of Defense, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
about strength. Tell us what your evaluation is as to his strength 
now, compared to, say, 1991, when the war ended. And is he get- 
ting stronger? And if so, how? 

Director Deutch. The answer, the response I was making to 
Senator Cohen was in terms of his external political status in the 
region, vis-a-vis the coalition. I would say internally his capabilities 
are less than they were 4 years ago. His military capabilities are 

Chairman SPECTER. Is he getting weaker? 

Director Deutch. Certainly, his capabilities are getting weaker. 

Chairman SPECTER. Military capabilities? 

Director DEUTCH. Yes. 

Chairman SPECTER. But he still has an air force, he still has sub- 
stantial ground forces. 

Director Deutch. Yes, but highly constrained. 

But my answer would be on capabilities. Over the long-term, he's 
gotten significantly weaker. In the last 6 weeks, he has gotten 
stronger politically in the region. 

Chairman Specter. Well, thank you very much, Director Deutch. 

Senator Cohen. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Specter. I want to make one final comment. 

Senator Cohen. This may be my final opportunity to question 
the Director, certainly in public, and perhaps in private as well. 
We've heard testimony that there was not an intelligence failure, 
as far as Khobar Towers were concerned. And there was no intel- 
ligence, I guess, tactical failure or deficiency as such. 

But I'd like to talk about the situation with the Kurds. Was there 
an intelligence failure as far as anticipating the breakup or the 
split between Barzani and Talabani? We, after all, have had a good 
deal of involvement with Operation Provide Comfort. We know 
about the tensions between the warring factions with the Kurds. 
We know that there was a commission set up to be funded by the 
Administration as far as trying to hold them together in some kind 
of an amicable situation that would have cost several million dol- 
lars that was not forthcoming. Was there an intelligence failure on 
our part to fail to fund programs that would at least give them a 
forum to debate their issues, their conflicts, and to allow them to 


fall apart in the sense that Talabani turns to the Iranians, and we 
have Barzani turning to Saddam Hussein? 

Director Deutch. There was no intelligence failure in the north, 

Senator Cohen. In other words, it was not preventable? 

Director Deutch. Between the two parties? 

Senator Cohen. It was not — the United States could not have 
taken any action that would have prevented the split that allowed 
one set of Kurds to go to the Iranians and the other set to go to 
Saddam Hussein? 

Director Deutch. I think that's an unanswerable question, but 
in the short run, the answer would have been tactically, in the last 
few months, especially after the Iranians indicated a willingness to 
come in and support the PUK. 

Senator Cohen. What I'm asking, before that, did we have intel- 
ligence indicating that the tensions were developing to the 

Director Deutch. Yes. 

Senator Cohen [continuing]. Where there was going to be a re- 
sort to outside sources for funding, as opposed to holding the unit 

Director DEUTCH. Well, some of these things, I think it's difficult 
to pursue here with clarity. But, roughly speaking, yes, sir. And I 
cannot believe that this is the last time that you will question me. 

Senator COHEN. In public, I said. 

Director Deutch. Right. 

Senator Cohen. This may be our last 

Director Deutch. That's what I meant, too. 

Chairman SPECTER. Director Deutch, thank you very much for 
coming in today, and for your testimony. The Committee is now 
going to go into closed session. 

I agree with what Senator Cohen said, that it is surprising that 
we cannot have General Downing in open session. Since my open- 
ing statement on the comments. General Downing arrived at about 
10:15, and I had a brief conversation with him, and I asked him 
his specific situation, and he says that Dr. Perry owns the Downing 
Commission report. That General Downing is a paid employee of 
the Department of Defense and has to respond to their instruc- 
tions. He said he'll be a private citizen in a week or two, and he 
may return in an open session before the Intelligence Committee 
at that time. 

That concludes our hearing. We now go into closed session. 

Director Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you. 

[Thereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the Hearing was concluded.] 



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ISBN 0-16-054223-5 

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